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Abstract 
In many organizations, productivity relies not just on individual effort but also on group morale, 
that is, the willingness of co-workers to help each other perform better at work. Relative 
performance evaluations (RPE) are known to increase individual work morale but may 
negatively affect group morale because they create a sense of competition among members of a 
reference group. In a novel experiment, I vary whether or not members of a reference group 
obtain relative performance information on a task that is relevant for their social image or self-
image, a general knowledge test. I measure how this affects the subsequent willingness to help 
the productivity of others by sharing knowledge with them at a personal cost. I find that RPE 
cause members of a reference group to compete as intensely as under relative pay, compared to 
a baseline with no relative performance information and fixed piece-rates. It also increases the 
perceived social distance between them. Yet, I show that even after a performance competition, 
individuals are willing to help the productivity of others in the group. These findings advance 
our understanding of how relative concerns among co-workers affect the way they work together. 
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1. Introduction  
Jobs require more and more that employees work together. (Lazear and Shaw 2007; 
Deming 2017). Therefore, to understand productivity in organizations, it is important to 
understand what makes groups of co-workers productive. In many organizations with group 
work, social comparison in performance is encouraged. Firms such as, for example, Amazon2 or 
Yahoo3, evaluate their employees’ relative performances by ranking them. Schools and 
universities are another class of organizations in which relative performance evaluations are 
common. These type of social incentives are known to increase the productivity of individuals 
(Blanes i Vidal and Nossol 2011; Kuhnen and Tymula 2012; Tran and Zeckhauser 2012; Gill et 
al. 2018). But little attention has been paid to how they affect other behavior in workgroups. 
Relative performance information seems to encourage cheating and sabotage in reference groups 
(Charness, Masclet and Villeval 2014). How do relative performance evaluations affect how well 
people work together?  
One important factor of how well people work together is group morale that I define as 
the willingness of co-workers to help each other perform better at work.4  
Microsoft is an example of a firm where relative performance information appears to have 
had unintended consequences in workgroups. In November 2013, the company abolished a 
relative performance evaluation scheme under which employees within organizational units were 
ranked according to their performances. This ranking system was partly blamed for a “lost 
decade” at the company5 and highly unpopular with employees. “It leads to employees focusing 
on competing with each other rather than competing with other companies”, as one Microsoft 
employee describes it. An important rationale for the abolition was to “promote new levels of 
teamwork” and “put more emphasis on teamwork and collaboration” (Microsoft Humam 
Ressource Chief).6  
In this paper, I use a laboratory experiment to investigate empirically whether this concern 
is warranted. Does relative performance information lower group morale? The study is designed 
to shed light on the following mechanism: relative performance information may cause members 
                                         
2 “Inside Amazon: Wrestling Big Ideas in a Bruising Workplace”, The New York Times, accessed April 9, 2018 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/technology/inside-amazon-wrestling-big-ideas-in-a-bruising-workplace.html 
3 Marissa Mayer famously introduced a relative performance ranking system when she joined Yahoo in 2012, see, e.g., 
“What Marissa Mayer Got Wrong (and Right) About Stack Ranking Employees”, Harvard Business Review, accessed 
April 9, 2018 https://hbr.org/2015/01/what-marissa-mayer-got-wrong-and-right-about-stack-ranking-employees 
4 I use the term group morale in a narrow sense, to describe the willingness of individuals to help the performance of 
others. With this, I follow how economists have integrated the concept of individual (work) morale in their work. 
This concept also emphasizes the motivation to exert more effort in order to perform better individually.  
5 “Microsoft’s Lost Decade”, Vanity Fair, accessed 9 April, 2018, 
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/business/2012/08/microsoft-lost-mojo-steve-ballmer 
6 “Microsoft Axes its Controversial Employee-ranking System”, The Verge, accessed on 9. April 2018, 
https://www.theverge.com/2013/11/12/5094864/microsoft-kills-stack-ranking-internal-structure 
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of a reference group to compete against one another and this may lower their willingness to help 
each other perform better. 
The experimental laboratory offers two important advantages over observational data sets. 
Firstly, I can isolate the effect that a competitive environment in and of itself has on the 
willingness to help the productivity co-workers. Career concerns can offer a strategic motive to 
not invest in the productivity of those who compete for promotions. They are hard to disentangle 
from relative concerns per se, under which co-workers simply want to maintain outcome 
differences. In the experiment, strategic motives are completely shut down because helping 
others’ productivity does not affect the probability of obtaining a high or low performance rank. 
Secondly, I can pin down the effect of relative performance information because I can precisely 
control a major confounding factor present in data from companies such as Microsoft: high 
relative performances come, at least in the medium run, with a monetary prize such as 
promotions. Employees may simply compete for the money that comes with high rankings. 
Alternatively, the relative performance information per se may be sufficient to spur a 
competition for non-monetary or image-based rewards. Given that relative performance 
information is ubiquitous, it is important to know whether this feature of an organization alone 
can cause a competition and lead to unintended consequences within reference groups.  
In my experiment, a total of 282 subjects participate in one of four experimental conditions. 
I vary experimentally whether members of a reference group receive only absolute feedback on 
a timed general knowledge test (baseline) or also an evaluation of their relative performances on 
this test. In the private rank feedback treatment, a group member observes her performance 
rank in the group (rank 1, rank 2 or rank 3). In the public rank feedback treatment, I establish 
common knowledge about performance ranks in the group, by displaying the picture of a group 
member next to that group member’s performance rank. Thus, these two treatments give people 
the kind of relative performance feedback that has been shown to motivate people to work harder 
individually (see e.g. Blanes i Vidal and Nossol 2011; Tran and Zeckhauser 2012). A control 
treatment introduces relative pay. A group member observes her performance rank in private 
and the best performer in a group earns a substantial monetary bonus.  
I use these conditions to test, in a between-subject design, whether relative performance 
evaluations cause the perception of competition within a reference group and whether this 
impacts on group members’ willingness to help others in their group perform better. With the 
relative pay control treatment, I explore whether any results change moving from purely image-
based rewards to a monetary reward for relative performance. 
For this purpose, in the second part of the experiment, I measure group morale in a way 
that closely resembles the type of help that is important in workgroups: sharing knowledge.  
Participants answer more general knowledge questions for a fixed monetary piece-rate. 
They can invest in the performance of others in their reference group by sharing their answers 
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to this new set of questions at a small personal cost. Sharing answers can improve the 
performance and earnings of other group members because the computer automatically replaces 
their incorrect answers with a correct answer that was shared.  
I model helping as a prosocial act. It comes at a small cost and benefits others in the group 
without any direct monetary benefit for the person who lends helps. This mirrors the actual cost 
of helping in organizations. Moreover, this type of prosocial help among co-workers should be 
very sensitive to the intensity of competition between them.  
Throughout the experiment, nobody observes the help behavior of others. Importantly, 
this design feature rules out that the desire to demonstrate to others a (perceived) advantage in 
knowledge or a prosocial attitude motivate knowledge-sharing decisions. 
This study introduces the knowledge-sharing task in order to elicit “real help”7 behavior: 
the outcome of the help decision depends on the performance of the person who lends help and 
the one who receives help. The knowledge-sharing task captures this important dimension of on-
the-job help outside of the laboratory. This sets it apart from experimental paradigms that model 
prosocial workplace behavior with the transfer of money. 
In the third part of the experiment, I measure participants’ beliefs about the correctness 
of their own and their group members’ answers to all questions for which help decisions were 
made, in an incentivized and incentive-compatible way. This data is important for two reasons. 
Firstly, I can confirm that people share their knowledge in order to make others perform better. 
Secondly, I can account for the fact that the rank information of the treatments may change 
beliefs about the value of own help to others in the group. This may contribute to people helping 
differently across experimental conditions, in addition to the competition channel. I also elicit 
the sense of competition and social distance in reference groups, as well as beliefs about the 
expected help by others. With this data, I evaluate the impact that relative performance 
evaluations have on the perception of social relations in reference groups. 
I find that both private and public relative performance feedback causes a large and 
statistically significant increase in the level of competition among group members, compared to 
the baseline condition with a very low level of competition. I find that the intensity of 
competition under private or public relative performance evaluations, is, on average, as large as 
the intensity of competition when group members compete for relative pay. Relative performance 
evaluations also increase the social distance between members of experimental reference groups.  
I then show that even after a performance competition, a substantial share of participants 
helps the productivity of others in the group. With my data, I can very precisely estimate that 
after a performance competition, group members are, on average, as willing to help each other 
                                         
7 Analogously to how experimental economists use the term “real effort” (see e.g. Charness, Gneezy, and Henderson 
2018) the term “real help” is used to indicate that the outcome of the help decision depends on the performances of 
the person who lends help and of the person who receives help. 
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perform better as in the baseline condition in which group members do not compete.8 This is 
true for the private rank feedback, the public rank feedback and the relative pay treatments. 
 Participants are much more likely to share answers that they think will improve the 
performance of their group members, as evidenced by estimates of binary choice models that 
predict the probability of sharing answers. This is consistent with a measure of group morale.  
My study offers two insights for relative performance evaluations and productivity in 
organizations. Firstly, relative performance information is likely to trigger a comparative and 
competitive mind-set in reference groups. Secondly, this study’s findings provide initial evidence 
that the willingness of co-workers to extend on-the-job help does not systematically decrease as 
the work environment becomes more competitive. 
This is a more positive outlook on relative concerns among co-workers and how they 
impact on the way co-workers interact and work together, than what the prior views of business 
insiders9 or related research may suggest. 
A small but growing empirical literature finds that relative pay concerns among co-workers 
entail behavioral spillovers to workplace behavior. In a laboratory experiment with a real effort 
task, Carpenter, Matthews and Schirm (2010) find that relative performance pay causes an 
increase in sabotage among members of a reference group, even if sabotaging others’ work has 
no effect on the likelihood of winning the bonus competition. In a large-scale online experiment, 
Buser and Dreber (2016) show that competing for relative pay significantly and sizably lowers 
subsequent contributions in an unrelated Public Goods Game, compared to a baseline condition 
with a fixed piece-rate. Breza, Kaur, and Shamdasani (2018) investigate in a field experiment 
how relative pay concerns affect workers’ individual work morale and their ability to work 
together. They find that a shared history of wage disparities, established on the basis of relative 
performance differences in reference groups, lowers co-workers’ ability to produce together in 
joint production tasks in which it is in the self-interest of co-workers to work together. This 
present study adds to this literature by isolating how relative concerns in a non-monetary 
domain, the performance domain, affect how well members of a reference group work together. 
In light of the prominence of relative performance information in organizations, this is an 
important gap to fill.  
                                         
8 Given the study’s sample size, I can calculate the power of a two-sided t-test at a level of significance of at least ! = 0.05 to reject the null hypothesis that group morale is not affected by a performance competition in reference 
groups for different standardized effect sizes (d), i.e. standardized difference in means across two conditions. For what 
is typically considered a medium standardized effect size & = 0.5, this study would reject the null hypothesis of no 
effect 85% of the times with the likelihood of a Type-2 error as low as 15%.  
9 In addition to the perception at Microsoft, CEOs of other companies have also voiced concerns about relative 
evaluations of employees on the ground that they may hinder collaboration. Qualtric’s CEO Smith is quoted with 
the following opinion on relative performance evaluations: “Stack-ranking is fine, says Smith, for evaluating 
performance in a sales organization, where managers may want to heighten competition. It's less well suited, he 
says, for evaluating engineers, among whom management may want to create closer collaboration.”, “Cooperation 
“Microsoft: 'Stack-Ranking' Gets Heave-Ho”, accessed 9, April , 2018 https://abcnews.go.com/Business/microsoft-
abolishes-stack-ranking-employees/story?id=20877556 
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Two treatment manipulations—private and public performance rank feedback on a general 
knowledge test—build on a large conceptual literature in behavioral economics on people being 
motivated by self-image (Köszegi 2006) and social image (Bénabou and Tirole 2006; Ellingsen 
and Johannesson 2008; Besley and Ghatak 2008). Several empirical studies confirm that people 
like to signal to themselves or to others that they are intelligent (Tran and Zeckhauser 2012, 
Ewers and Zimmermann 2015). But there are a few studies that find that introducing an 
audience can actually lower the desire to signal competence or ambition to others (McManus 
and Rao 2015; Bursztyn, Fujiwara, and Pallais 2017). I considered these findings in the design 
of my experiment, attempting to ensure that performing well and being seen as performing well 
at the real effort task is desirable for the participants.  
This paper explores a potential cost to relative performance information. Two related 
studies reveal different unintended side effects of relative performance feedback in firms. In a 
field experiment, Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2013) show that rank feedback reduces the 
average productivity in a firm because this information changes how work teams form. Charness, 
Masclet and Villeval (2014) show that public performance rankings cause members of a reference 
group to spend money in order to artificially increase their own performance, i.e. to cheat, or to 
lower the output of others in their group, i.e. to sabotage. The findings of my study draw 
attention to the fact that more research is needed to understand when social incentives in the 
form of relative performance feedback do, and when they do not backfire in reference groups.  
My paper also contributes to the empirical literature on on-the-job help. While a link 
between tournaments in firms and incentives to help has been established theoretically (Lazear 
1989), there are only a few papers in economics that investigate empirically the determinants of 
on on-the-job help. With survey data among employees of a plant, Drago and Garvey (1998) 
provide correlational evidence that promotion tournaments lower employees’ qualitative ratings 
of their co-workers willingness to provide help (e.g. by sharing tools or machinery). Danilov, 
Harbring, and Irlenbusch (2019) present findings from a laboratory experiment that models help 
as the transfer of money and compares help under different combinations of team-pay and 
relative performance pay. They find that helping changes with the monetary incentives in the 
expected direction; it decreases as the relative performance incentive raises and increases as the 
team-pay gets larger. The findings oft this present study advance this literature by providing 
causal evidence on whether relative concerns among co-workers in and of themselves 
systematically affect the willingness to help the productivity of other co-workers.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows, section 2 presents a framework to illustrate 
the effects under study, in section 3, I outline the design of my experiment in detail. Section 4 
shows the results and section 5 discusses them and concludes.  
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2. Framework  
In the following, I present a simple conceptual framework to illustrate how relative 
performance evaluations can change group morale, that is, the willingness to help others perform 
better in reference groups. An employee (') receives a piece-rate ( for good performance on a 
task. The employee either knows how to solve this task ()* = 1) or does not ()* = 0). Her utility 
is -* = ()*.  
She can lend help ℎ* ∈ 0,1  to a co-worker (1) in her reference group, for example, by 
sharing her knowledge on how to solve the task, to improve his performance. Helping comes at 
a small cost 2 > 0.10  Her payoff 4 ℎ* 	from helping is: 4 ℎ* = 6 7*, )*, )8 -8(ℎ*) − 2ℎ*	
where 6() is a group morale effect term. Helping a colleague can increase his performance. 
I use the notation -8 ℎ*  to indicate 1’s expected monetary payoff as a function of employee '’s 
help. Likewise, -*(ℎ8) denotes '’s expected monetary payoff as a function of the help of colleague 1.11  
Clearly, the employee helps her co-worker whenever ;4 ℎ* = 6 7*, )*, )8 ;-8(ℎ*) ≥ 2.	
The benefit to help is increasing in 6() such that, ceteris paribus, employees with a higher 
group morale are more likely to help other colleagues to perform better. Helping is an act that 
benefits her co-worker, therefore, an employee’s group morale is linked to her prosociality. I 
conceptualize it in the following way: 6 7*, )*	, )=* = 7* − >()*, )8)	
The employee gives weight 7* ∈ [0,1] to the utility of her co-worker. There is ample 
evidence that people differ in their prosocial inclinations. Thus, this simply captures that some 
colleagues are more inclined to help than others and some may never help (e.g. 7* = 0). In 
addition, relative performance concerns > )*, )8  may change an employee’s group morale or, in 
other words, the value that she assigns to improving the performance and earnings of her 
colleague. Note that without this second term, the group morale term 6() is a simple altruism 
model. It is common to conceptualize the weight that people give to the utility of others as 
partly determined by the decision context, for example, by others’ behavior (Rabin 1993) or by 
their prosocial type (Levine 1998) or, as in this framework, by relative performance concerns.  
                                         
10 For example, there is an opportunity cost of time when she spends some time explaining the solution to her co-
worker. 
11 Of course, it may be that  -8 ℎ* = 1 = -8 ℎ* = 0 , for example, when group member 1	knows how to solve the task 
in which case	-8 ℎ* = 1 = -8 ℎ* = 0 = (.  
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I conceptualize relative performance concerns as a comparison of performance outcomes.12  
For example, an employee compares her own performance rank A*()*, )8) to the performance 
rank A8 )*, )8  of a colleague in her reference group: > )*, )8 = BC	D A* − A8 	
where D ∙ : ℛ → 0,1 . 13 The parameter BC ∈ [0,1] represents the extent to which relative 
performance concerns are prevalent in a reference group and the subscript I stands for treatment. 
I incorporate this into the employee’s group morale term: 6 7*, )*	, )8 = 7* − BCD A* − A8 ∈ [−1,1]	
This captures the idea that an employee’s concern for improving the performance of other 
co-workers is shaped by her relative performance concerns, when these are salient in her reference 
groups. Initial empirical work on relative performance concerns and unethical behavior in 
reference groups suggests that >()*, )8) enters the group morale term negatively (Charness, 
Masclet and Villeval 2014). So does conceptual work on preferences for status. Note that the 
group morale term could also be negative, in which case an employee may be willing to sabotage 
her co-worker.14 
Treatment Manipulations and Group Morale  
I hypothesize that relative performance rankings create a sense of competition in reference 
groups that activates positional concerns over relative performances. Rustichini (2008, p. 653) 
summarizes the link between competition and relative concerns in a review article on dominance 
and competition in the following way: “Humans who participate in a contest with others have 
strong preferences on relative outcomes, and are ready to translate these preferences into costly 
choices”. This implies the following for the salience of relative performance concerns across 
experimental conditions:  BJKLMN*OM < BQR*SKCMTU ≤ BQWJN*XTU	
The second weak inequality summarizes my hypothesis about public rank feedback. The 
provision of public performance ranks may further strengthen relative performance concerns 
since it explicitly invokes social image in intelligence by establishing common knowledge about 
every group member’s performance rank within the reference group.  
                                         
12 The framework does not explicitly model comparisons of monetary outcomes. Group members did not observe the 
actual earnings of other group members, since they did not know the absolute performance of others on the timed 
general knowledge test. Ranks were (weakly) informative about earnings differences in the group.  
13 I do not make any assumptions on the shape of this function D(⋅) other than bounding the positive or negative 
impact it can have on the weight that an employee gives to the utility of her co-worker j. In order to detect an effect 
of relative performance information on group morale in this experiment it just needs to be that D Z |\∈ =],=^,^,] ≠ 0.  
14 The possibility for sabotage is ruled out by design in this experiment.  
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As the salience of relative performance concerns increases from BC` to BC, group morale 
decreases. To see this, note that in this case, the benefit of helping another group member 
perform better decreases by (BC` − BC)D(A* − A8), whenever D A* − A8 ≠ 0.  
Thus, in a between-subject design, I can identify the effect of relative performance concerns 
on the willingness to help others in the reference group perform better by comparing average 
help in the baseline condition to average help under private or public rank feedback.15  
A control treatment introduces relative performance pay. Compared to the baseline 
condition with fixed piece-rates and no rank information, relative performance concerns should 
be more salient under relative pay, that is, I hypothesize that JKLMN*OM <RMNKC*SM	QKa. 16 
 In the next section, I present how I manipulated the salience of relative performance 
concerns across the four experimental conditions and how I measure group morale. Once the 
design is introduced, I re-state my hypotheses in terms of behavior in the experiment. 
3. Experiment Design  
3.1. Overview 
In a first part of the experiment, I induce a sense of competition in reference groups by 
providing relative performance feedback on a task that people perceive as relevant for their social 
and self-image: a general knowledge test. In a between-subject design, I vary by experimental 
condition whether or not group members’ performances on the test are evaluated relative to one 
another. In a control treatment, I introduce relative pay that is based on relative performance 
on this general knowledge test. I then measure, in a second part of the experiment, how the 
treatment affects the willingness to help others in the reference group perform better. With this 
design, I test whether a competitive environment in and of itself has a negative effect on group 
morale. The final parts of the experiment, 3 and 4, elicit further outcome measures and control 
variables.  
 Table 1 summarizes the timeline of the experiment. The following paragraphs provide the 
details for each part.  
  
                                         
15 With random assignment to treatment, I can rule out that participants’ general inclination to help others, 7*, differs 
systematically across treatments, that is, with random assignment to treatment it holds that b 7* IAc7IdceI =b	[7*].  
16 It is not clear whether monetary and non-monetary returns to high relative performance ranks complement or 
substitute each other. While the salience of relative concerns should not be lower in the relative pay condition, 
compared to the private rank feedback condition, it need not necessarily be higher. 
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Table 1. Timeline of Experiment  
Part 1 Performance and Feedback 
Stage 1 Measure general knowledge 
Stage 2 Timed general knowledge test with varying 
 relative performance feedback and pay (by treatment) 
Part 2 Measure Group Morale  
Part 3 Measure Beliefs 
Part 4 Questionnaire 
3.2. The Real Effort Task  
Throughout the experiment, the real effort task was to answer multiple choice17 general 
knowledge questions for a fix piece-rate. 
 Participants obtained 25 points for each correct answer. These points were converted at 
a fixed exchange rate to 1.5 CHF (≈1.5 USD) in pay at the end of the experiment with certainty 
or with 50% probability whenever the payout of a stage depended on the random draw of a 
computer. 
I chose this real effort task for several reasons. Firstly, participants cared about performing 
well and being seen as performing well on this task, a fact that was established in pre-tests. This 
is important since two treatments involved the provision of relative performance feedback on a 
general knowledge test, without any extrinsic rewards to relative performance.  
Secondly, sharing answers to general knowledge questions is a natural way to allow for 
mutual help on this task. This qualifies as a “real help” task since the outcome of a help decision 
depends on the performance of the person who provides help and the person who receives it.  
Thirdly, performance on this task was not affected by treatment. Participants either knew 
the answer to these questions or not. Thus, there was little scope for the treatments to 
systematically change performance outcomes and, consequently, earnings in Part 1. This 
provides a very clean test of whether a competitive environment in and of itself negatively affects 
the willingness to help the productivity of others. 
Each general knowledge question included in the study was pre-tested in the same subject 
pool to ensure that the composition of questions in terms of difficulty and the field of general 
knowledge tested was comparable across parts of the study.18  
                                         
17 Each question had four answer choices.  
18 The objective of the pre-tests was to include questions in the main experiment that would be neither too difficult 
nor too easy, that questions would be comparable across parts and that there would be no gender differences in 
performance on average. Average performance data across the different general knowledge tests, i.e., across Part 1 
Stages 1 and 2 and Part 2, and by gender show that all of these objectives were fulfilled.  
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3.3. Part 1—Performance and Feedback  
Part 1 had two stages.  
In the first stage of Part 1, every participant was tested on his general knowledge with 10 
multiple choice questions. Participants had to provide an answer to each question. Performance 
on these first questions measures baseline ability at answering the type of general knowledge 
questions that are used throughout the study. For this first ability measure, everything was held 
constant across experimental conditions.  
At the beginning of the second stage of Part 1, groups were introduced. The computer 
randomly selected three participants from the same session to form a group. These groups 
remained fixed for the rest of the experiment. When groups were introduced, each group member 
saw the portraits of everyone in his group.19 The pictures were on display for 30 seconds when 
no instructions were read and there was no option to advance to the next screen. In this way, 
the timing of when participants saw their other group members for the first time was held 
constant across all experimental conditions.20  
In this second stage of Part 1, participants had to answer as many general knowledge 
questions as possible under some time pressure. This design feature was introduced to ensure 
heterogeneity in performance on this set of questions.  
Participants had 3 minutes to answer a series of 20 multiple choice questions. Questions 
appeared on their computer screens one at a time and an answer had to be submitted for the 
next question to appear on the screen. All participants saw the same sequence of the same 20 
questions and this known to the participants.  
When the three minutes had elapsed, group members were automatically advanced to a 
feedback screen, whether or not they had provided an answer to all questions. This is the point 
at which the treatment manipulation occurred, as subjects received different information about 
their relative performance.  
3.4. Experimental Conditions  
When they performed the timed general knowledge test, group members knew what type 
of feedback they would receive. The feedback screen was on display for one minute and 
participants were unable to manually advance to the next screen.  
In the baseline condition, each group member found out how many out of the 20 questions 
he answered correctly. No information on the performance of others in the group was provided. 
                                         
19 Pictures were taken at the beginning of the session by an experimenter. 
20 This is important since Buser and Dreber (2016) find suggestive evidence that a simple group prime may activate 
norms of competition. In keeping this aspect constant, I rule out that the public rank feedback treatment, which 
shows subjects pictures of their other two group members, operates through priming the group more strongly 
compared to the other two conditions. 
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Thus, group members had no reference point against which to compare their general knowledge 
score. 
In the private rank feedback treatment, a group member also discovered how his 
performance compared to the performance of others in his reference group. He found out whether 
he ranked first, second or third in his group. Rankings were based on the number of questions 
answered correctly during the timed task with ties broken at random. This treatment introduced 
a performance competition and manipulated self-image in knowledge, relative to group members.  
In the public rank feedback treatment, the feedback screen displayed the picture, the 
participant number and the performance rank of each group member. This way, the relative 
performance of each individual was common knowledge among the three members of a reference 
group. Therefore, the public rank feedback treatment made social image in intelligence explicit, 
while keeping the information about own relative performance the same as in the private rank 
feedback condition. With this condition, I can assess whether the perceived competition in 
reference groups is stronger when social image in intelligence is made explicit. 
Table 2 summarizes the information shown on the feedback screen in each condition and 
Figures A1-A3 in Appendix A reproduce images of the feedback screens as they were shown to 
participants. 
A control treatment introduced relative pay in an environment that was otherwise 
identical to the private rank feedback condition. The best performing group member on the 
timed general knowledge test received a substantial bonus of 5 CHF (≈5 USD) in addition to 
the piece-rate that was paid for each correct answer. Thus, the bonus amounted to 25% of the 
maximum earnings that a group member could receive for this timed general knowledge test. At 
the feedback stage, a participant observed his own performance rank and whether or not he 
would receive an additional bonus payment (see Figure A4 in Appendix A). With this condition, 
I can test to what extent, ceteris paribus, any results change with the domain of relative 
concerns, that is, when money is or is not involved. 
Table 2. Experimental Conditions 
Baseline  Absolute performance feedback after timed 
general knowledge test  
Private rank feedback treatment  Baseline + private information about own 
performance rank in group 
Public rank feedback treatment  Baseline + public information about everyone’s 
performance rank in group  
Relative pay treatment (control) Private rank feedback + best performer on 
timed test earns an additional bonus of 5 CHF 
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3.5. Part 2—Measuring Group Morale 
The feedback that subjects saw at the end of Part 1 was also summarized in their Part 2 
decision screens. 
In Part 2, group morale was measured in a task that was independent of the relative 
performance competition in Part 1. Part 2 comprised 10 new multiple choice general knowledge 
questions. Each group member had to provide an answer to each question. The piece-rate for 
correct answers stayed the same as in Part 1, that is, 25 points or 1.5 CHF.  
For each question in Part 2, a participant had the option to share his answer with the 
other two group members. I chose this type of task explicitly to model the kind of helping 
behavior that takes place in workplace settings, where someone who knows information (how to 
accomplish a task, the needs of a particular client) can share this information with others to 
help their productivity.  
Whenever a participant shared a correct answer to a question, the computer automatically 
replaced the incorrect answer of each group member who did not answer that question right 
with the correct answer that was shared. Sharing incorrect answers had no positive or negative 
effect on others in the group. This way, I ruled out by design that participants could sabotage 
the performance of others by sharing incorrect knowledge with them. The main reason is that, 
in organizations, on-the-job help is typically a prosocial task and help behavior in the experiment 
reflects this. 
The total benefit to sharing an answer was either 0, 25 or 50 points (0, 1.5 or 3 USD)—
depending on whether a correct answer was shared and on how many group members did not 
get a question right. This benefit went to others in the group.  
Sharing an answer to a question cost a participant 1 point or 0.06 CHF (≈0.06 USD). 
Thus, when a group member shared an answer he was willing to invest 1 point in the performance 
of others. That amounts to 4% of the piece-rate paid for correct answers.21 This small cost to 
knowledge sharing mirrors that in real organizations, on-the-job help comes with an opportunity 
cost. Moreover, that helping behavior in the experiment is, unambiguously, a prosocial act. 
This way, I elicited participants’ willingness to help others to perform better, observing 10 
decisions for each person regarding whether or not to share the answer to a Part 2 question with 
others in the group. Figure A5 in Appendix A shows a screenshot of the decision screen. All 
instructions for participants described the act of sharing answers with the more neutral term 
“sending answers” to other group members.  
                                         
21 This piece-rate was calibrated with a pilot study of the baseline condition to ensure that the level of knowledge- 
sharing in the baseline condition was neither too high (i.e. above 75% or higher) or to low (i.e. below 25%). In a first 
calibration of the design, the personal cost to sharing answers with others was 10% of the piece-rate under which the 
level of knowledge-sharing was too low.  
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Participants did not obtain feedback about choices that others made in Part 2. 
Participants were aware of this when they made their help decisions. Importantly, participants 
did not see who helped them, how much help they received or how many of their answers were 
replaced. I gave no feedback on help decisions to rule out that group members could seek to 
enhance their social image in a second dimension, namely, a reputation for being prosocial. This 
could interact with the treatments making it more difficult to isolate the direct effect of relative 
performance evaluations on the willingness to invest in the productivity of others. At the very 
end of the experiment, participants found out how many Part-2-questions they answered 
correctly when they saw their summary of earnings in the experiment.  
When participants performed in Part 1 they did not know anything specific about the 
other parts of the experiment. Importantly, participants were unaware that Part 2 would entail 
prosocial choices. This allows me to rule out that any effect of rank feedback on the willingness 
to help other group members is driven by selection into high rank positions based on social 
preferences, similarly to what Erkal, Gangadharan and Nikiforakis (2011) find in a study on 
competing for money and the subsequent willingness to redistribute earnings within a group.  
3.6. Part 3—Beliefs  
In Part 3 of the experiment, I elicited three beliefs for each Part-2-question; the subjective 
probabilities that a participant assigned to his answer and to the answer of each of the other 
two group members being correct.  
I implemented a mechanism to elicit subjective probabilities in an incentive compatible 
way that was described in Karni (2009) closely following the experimental protocol introduced 
in Coffman (2014). In this part of the experiment, there were 100 lotteries available that had an 
integer-probability on [1,100] of selecting a correct answer to a question. In other words, there 
were lotteries that had a 1% chance, 2% chance, 3% chance ... up to a 100% chance to provide 
a correct answer to a question. For each question, one of these lotteries was randomly selected, 
with each lottery equally likely to be chosen. Participants selected a threshold, X, such that for 
any lottery that selects the correct answer with a probability X or lower they would prefer their 
own answer to be evaluated for payment and for all lotteries that select the correct answer with 
a probability X or higher they would prefer the lottery to answer for them. Therefore, given a 
cut-off probability X’, a participant believes that the answer he provided to a question is correct 
with probability X’.  
For each question, participants stated three different such cut-off probabilities: one for the 
answer they provided themselves and one for the answer provided by each of the other group 
members. For payment, one of each of the three “types” of belief (self, two other group members) 
was randomly selected and evaluated. In this part, participants earned 2 CHF (≈2 USD) if they 
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submitted a correct answer, regardless of whether this answer was submitted by them, by one 
of their group members or by a lottery.  
For this belief elicitation task, the order of Part-2 questions was randomized at the subject-
level. 
With this data, I can assess whether participants intended to use help decisions 
instrumentally, to help group members. Sharing answers that one believes to not know is not 
helpful, neither is it to share answers that one believes the others to know for sure. Moreover, I 
can use this data to account for the pure information effect of rank feedback through which the 
treatment may systematically affect the willingness to help compared to the baseline with no 
relative performance information.   
I also asked participants to state how much help they expected to have received from each 
of the other two participants in their group. Participants earned 1 CHF when their guess of the 
number of answers that a group member shared with the group was within a margin of +/- 1 
question to the actual number of questions this person sent. Expectations about others’ help 
decisions could also influence the willingness to share knowledge, out of a desire to reciprocate 
or a desire to conform. Since rank feedback could also influence the help a group member expects 
to receive from others, it is important to have data on expected help.  
3.7. Part 4—Questionnaire  
In an exit questionnaire, I collected several measures to assess perceptions of social 
relations in the experimental reference groups. I measured the intensity of perceived competition 
in the experimental (reference) groups with an agreement to the following statement: “I felt in 
competition with the other two members in my group when performing this task.” on a 9-point 
Likert scale. “This task” refers to the timed general knowledge test of Part 1. This data was 
collected about 30 minutes after this stage of the experiment and serves as a test of whether 
relative performance feedback produced a sense of competition among the members of the 
reference group.  
On the same scale, participants also answered questions to assess to what extent 
performing well on the general knowledge test and being seen performing well by others was 
desirable and to evaluate whether they thought that the questions actually tested general 
knowledge.  
In addition, I measured the social distance among members of experimental reference 
groups with the Oneness index. It records the subjective perception of closeness between a 
participant and each of his group members, ranging from “no connection at all” to feeling “at 
one” with another person. This scale is widely used in psychology to measure the closeness of 
social relationships (Gächter, Starmer, and Tufano 2015a) and predicts behavior in economics 
studies involving decision-making in groups (see, e.g., Gächter, Starmer, and Tufano 2015b). 
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The Oneness index is constructed from responses to the Inclusion of the Self in Other (IOS)-
scale and the We-scale.  On the IOS-scale, a participant indicated how close he felt to another 
group member by selecting a pair of circles that best represents the relationship with that other 
group member. In these pairs, one circle depicts the participant and the other circle the other 
group member. Across the pairs, the circles differ in how much they overlap. See Figure A6 in 
Appendix A for the pictogram used in this task. For the We-scale, a participant indicated on a 
7-point Likert scale to what extent he would use the term “we” to characterize himself and 
another group member. The Oneness index is simply the average of a participant’s responses 
on these two scales for a given group member. As a measure of social relations in reference 
groups, this outcome variable provides complementary evidence for the change in 
competitiveness from the baseline to the treatment conditions. 
To complement my behavioral measure of group morale, I also elicited general attitudes 
toward cooperation, toward working in groups or working alone and toward competition, 
following the procedure for eliciting general attitudes presented in Duffy and Kornienko (2010). 
I also took their set of items eliciting attitudes on competition. For each of these general 
attitudes, participants evaluated the extent to which four statements applied to them on a 9-
point Likert scale ranging from 1 -does not apply at all, to 9 -definitely applies.22 For each 
category, e.g. for cooperativeness, an index is constructed which is the average response to the 
four statements that belong to the category, reverse-scoring responses when necessary. A list of 
all four items for each category with summary statistics is in Appendix A (Table A2). 
Lastly, I elicited positive and negative reciprocity as general traits with the set of questions 
described in Falk et al. (2016). The authors provide evidence that responses to these questions 
are highly correlated with behavior in experimental games that are typically used to measure 
reciprocity with decisions involving real monetary stakes. This allows me to test whether the 
treatment—that may impact prosocial help—also extends to general prosocial attitudes.  
The questionnaire concluded with a few questions on demographics and an elicitation of 
attitudes towards risk and towards competition. For each of these attitude measures, 
participants were asked to position themselves on a scale from 0 (very risk-averse; not 
competitive at all) to 10 (very risk-seeking; very competitive).  
3.8. Hypotheses About Behavior in the Experiment  
The experiment is designed to assess whether relative performance information lower group 
morale when participants make 10 help decisions in Part 2. I hypothesize that relative 
performance evaluations put group members in a competitive mindset with respect to one 
another, compared to an environment that, ceteris paribus, does not provide this information:  
                                         
22 For example, participants rated “I like to share my ideas and material with others.” which is a statement on 
cooperation or “I find that working in groups is often inefficient” which is an attitude toward working in groups. I 
included four questions per attitude to reduce the influence of an idiosyncratic question. 
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Hypothesis 1: Rank feedback causes a sense of competition in the reference group in Part 
1. 
 I test the mechanism that this competition activates positional concerns over relative 
performances, which may lower the motivation to subsequently extend prosocial help to others 
in order to increase their productivity (see also section 2). My study offers a direct test of the 
null hypothesis, 
Hypothesis 2-0: The sense of competition under relative performance feedback does not 
lower the willingness to help other group members perform better in Part 2.  
against the alternative hypothesis that, 
Hypothesis 2-A: The sense of competition under relative performance feedback lowers 
the willingness to help other group members perform better in Part 2.  
3.9. Experimental Procedures  
The experiment was conducted in English at the Laboratory for Experimental and 
Behavioral Economics at the University of Zurich. In total, 282 participants, most of them 
students at the University of Zurich and the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich, 
took part in the experiment. Table 3 lists the number of participants in the different conditions.23 
At the beginning of a session, an experimenter took pictures of all participants before 
participants took their seat in the laboratory. Participants were called individually by their 
participant number and were instructed to make a neutral face for the portrait. The composition 
was the same for every portrait, with a zoom on the face leaving out the upper body.  
Participants gave informed consent to having their picture taken and to the fact that these 
pictures may be linked to some of their choices in the experiment. 
 
Table 3. Overview of Data 
Condition  Participants 
Baseline obs.=72, 24 groups 
Private rank feedback  obs.=72, 24 groups 
Public rank feedback  obs.=66, 22 groups 
Relative Pay obs.=72, 24 groups 
Total obs.=282, 94 groups 
                                         
23 While 7 out of 9 sessions comprised 24 participants (8 groups), two sessions in the public rank feedback condition 
were conducted with 21 participants (7 groups) because some of those who registered did not show up.  
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The instructions for the study were displayed on the computer screen in a participant’s 
cubicle. Screenshots of the instructions and decision screens exactly as they were shown to 
participants are reproduced in Appendix B. An experimenter read the instructions for a part out 
loud just before participants made choices in that part. Before Part 2 and Part 3, participants 
also answered comprehension questions and the study only advanced after all participants had 
answered the questions correctly.  
The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). The computer selected for 
each participant whether the first stage of Part 1 or the second stage of Part 1 was selected for 
payment, giving equal weight to each option. Earnings in Parts 2 and 3 were always paid out. 
Average earnings were 40.00 CHF (≈40 USD) (including a 15 CHF show-up fee). 
4. Results 
First, I will consider results in support of Hypothesis 1. Then, I will turn to results on the 
treatment effect of relative performance information on group morale that lead to the main result 
of the paper regarding Hypotheses 2-0 and 2-A. I will then briefly present findings on the factors 
that predict helping behavior and consider findings from a control treatment that introduces 
relative pay. I conclude this section with results on the link between group morale and group 
productivity in the environment under study. 
4.1. Do Relative Performance Evaluations Affect 
Perceptions of Competition? 
Rank feedback on the timed general knowledge test of Part 1 mirrored actual performance 
differences among the group members in the absolute majority of reference groups.  
Performance on the timed general knowledge test of Part 1 varied substantially and 
performance ties occurred only in 12 % of the randomly formed experimental groups. On average, 
participants answered 11.3 out of 20 questions correctly (SD=3.0). The best performers in my 
sample answered 17 questions correctly and the worst performers 3. The empirical distributions 
of performance on this timed task are very similar across the four experimental conditions (see 
Figure A7 in Appendix A) and a Kruskal-Wallis test fails to reject the null hypothesis that these 
performance samples are drawn from the same population (p=0.4346).24 This is expected given 
that the task tested existing knowledge and effort had little to no scope to increase performance 
on this test.  
                                         
24 Consistent with this, participants did also not perform systematically differently across the four experimental 
conditions on the first set of questions that was administered before the treatment manipulation occurred: Kruksal-
Wallis test p-value=0.5410. On average, participants provided correct answers to 61% of questions on this first 
untimed general knowledge test (mean number of questions correct=6.160, SD=1.640).  
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Hypothesis 1 states that relative evaluations on this first timed general knowledge test 
produces perceptions of competition between group members. To address this question, I turn 
to data from the post-treatment questionnaire, in which several items asked specifically about 
the timed task in Part 1. I focus on the causal effect of providing relative performance feedback 
on participants’ agreement with the statement “I felt in competition with the other two members 
in my group when performing the task.” Responses can range from 1 (does not apply at all) to 
9 (definitely applies). Figure 1 visualizes the marked differences in the perception of competition 
in groups between the baseline and the two rank feedback conditions. In the baseline condition, 
the average sense of competition in groups is 2.0 on this competitiveness scale which is very low. 
The estimated average treatment effect of private rank feedback is an increase of 3.4 points on 
the 9-point competitiveness scale with a 95% confidence interval of [2.68, 4.12]. The estimated 
effect of public rank feedback is a 3.8-point increase in the sense of competition with others in 
the reference group with a 95% confidence interval of [3.10, 4.49]. These effects are highly 
statistically significant (two-sided t-tests: Bas-Priv. RF p<0.0001; Bas-Pub. RF p< 0.0001). The 
fact that this data was collected 30 minutes after participants completed Part 1 indicates that 
this information had a lasting impact on the sense of competition in reference groups. 
Whether the performance feedback is public or private appears to not make a sizable 
difference in the sense of competition in reference groups. The effect of a public ranking over a 
private ranking is 0.40 points on the competitiveness scale with a 95% confidence interval of  
[-0.51, 1.29], which includes 0 and is not statistically significant (two-sided t-test p=0.3926).  
Importantly, while relative performance feedback changed the perception of competition 
among group members, other aspects of how individuals evaluated the task in Part 1 did not 
change. Using a 9-point scale on which higher numbers indicate more agreement with a 
statement, participants thought that the general knowledge questions did, in fact, measure their 
general knowledge (mean agreement=7.26, SD=1.83). Participants also wanted to perform well 
at the Part 1 performance stage (mean agreement=8.15, SD=1.32) and would be impressed if 
others answered 90% or more of the general knowledge questions in the experiment correctly 
(mean agreement=7.35, SD=2.12). The treatments had virtually no effect on this (see Figure 
A8 in Appendix A for a visualization). All in all, this supports the interpretation that the timed 
task of Part 1 is relevant for perceptions of competence, and that individuals valued performing 
well and being seen as performing well on the task. 
 
  
19 
 
Figure 1. Perceptions of Competition by Condition 
 
Note. Perception of competition is measured as agreement with the 
statement “I felt in competition with the other two members in my group 
when performing this task [Part 1 timed general knowledge test].” on a 
scale from 1 (“does not apply at all”) to 9 (“definitely applies”).  
Relative performance evaluations also increase the perceived social distance between 
members of experimental reference groups. The Oneness index (Gächter, Starmer, and Tufano 
2015b) is a simple instrument to measure how close subjects perceive themselves to be to every 
other group member on a scale from 1 (no connection at all) to 7 (feeling as “one” with another 
person). In column 1 of Table 4, I present the results from ordinary least square (OLS) 
regressions of the Oneness index, averaged over the two group members of a participant, on 
treatment indicators. The results indicate that rank feedback decreased the social closeness 
between members of experimental reference groups, when group members were asked 35 minutes 
after the end of Part 1 how close they felt to others in their group. The estimated average 
treatment effect is 0.51, or half a category on this 7-point scale, under private rank information 
and 0.40 under public rank information. 
In contrast, general attitudes toward working in groups or working alone were not 
systematically affected by the treatments (columns 2) and 3) of Table 4). 
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Table 4. Rank Feedback, Relative Pay, Social Closeness and General Attitudes on Groupwork 
 Social closeness with 
group members 
General attitude 
working in groups 
General attitude 
working alone 
Private RF -0.514*** 
(0.181) 
-0.243 
(0.229) 
0.191 
(0.187) 
Public RF -0.399* 
(0.206) 
0.155 
(0.215) 
0.071 
(0.200) 
Relative Pay  -0.469** 
(0.205) 
-0.215 
(0.234) 
0.184 
(0.230) 
Constant 3.028*** 
(0.130) 
5.083*** 
(0.154) 
6.038*** 
(0.122) 
Obs. 282 282 282 
Notes. The data was collected for each participant i in a questionnaire at the end of the study. Private RF 
and Public RF are indicators for participant i privately observing his performance rank on the timed task 
or publicly observing the performance rank of everyone in his group, respectively. Relative Pay indicates 
that participant i was in the control treatment that paid a bonus to the best performer, in addition to 
providing rank feedback in private. Social closeness with group members is the average of the two responses 
of i on the oneness index measuring how close i feels to each group member j. This variable ranges from 
[0,7]. General attitudes on working in groups and on working alone are indices that range from 1 (strongly 
negative attitude) to 9 (strongly positive attitude). Robust standard errors are in parentheses, 94 group 
clusters allow for correlated observations at the group and at the subject level. *Significant at the 10% 
level,** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. 
All these findings support the conclusion that relative performance evaluations changed 
the perceptions of social relations within the experimental reference groups. This leads to the 
following first result: 
Result 1: Rank feedback information causes perceptions of competition between group 
members and increases their social distance. 
How does this increase in the salience of relative performance concerns under competition 
affect the willingness of group members to help each other perform better? These are the next 
results I turn to.  
4.2. Do Increased Perceptions of Competition Affect Group 
Morale? 
Statistical Hypothesis Testing   
In the following section, I present results from analyzing help behavior in Part 2 of the 
experiment with a focus on the treatment effect of relative performance feedback. Throughout 
this section, I compare behavior in the baseline condition to behavior in the two treatments that 
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provided relative performance information, that is, the private rank feedback and public rank 
feedback treatment conditions. 
First, I estimate the causal effect of relative performance evaluations on the total number 
of answers a group member shared out of the 10 Part 2 questions (see Table 5).  
Table 5. Average Treatment Effect of Rank Feedback on Help  
ATE ghij − gklmik 95% confidence interval 
Bas-Priv. RF: 0.36 [-0.69, 1.41] 
Bas-Pub. RF: 0.013 [-1.12,1.15] 
The estimated average treatment effect of private rank feedback is a decrease in 0.36 
questions shared, with a 95% confidence interval of [-0.69,1.41] and a p-value of 0.50. This 
confidence interval includes zero and the decrease in average help of 3.6% is not statistically 
significant at any reasonable significance threshold. The estimated average treatment effect of 
relative performance feedback is even smaller, a decrease in 0.013 questions shared with a 
confidence interval of [-1.12, 1.15] that includes zero and a p-value of 0.98.25 It is important to 
highlight that the estimated confidence intervals are narrow, which means that the average 
treatment effects are precisely estimated. Section 6 gives a detailed account of the statistical 
power of this study.  
Figure 2 shows that also the empirical distributions of number of answers shared look very 
similar across the three experimental conditions. A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test fails to reject 
the null hypothesis that the baseline and treatment samples of help behavior are drawn from 
the same population (Bas-Priv. RF p=0.535, Bas-Pub. RF p=0.775). 
The empirical distributions of help also visualize that there are three different empirical 
“types” of people. The “resolute helpers” share all ten answers to their questions and the 
“selfish”-type does not share any answers. The majority of people share some answers with 
others. In the baseline condition, for example, 11% are resolute helpers and 17% of group 
members are selfish.  
The shares of the selfish-type and the resolute helpers are remarkably consistent across 
the three experimental conditions (see Figure 2). This is further evidence suggesting that the 
treatments did not systematically affect behavioral motives for knowledge-sharing.  
                                         
25 These are the Average Treatment Effects (ATE) and confidence intervals when I treat each group member as one 
observation. The precision of my ATE estimates are very similar when I collapse observations at the group level, 
which takes into account that group members may have been exposed to some common shocks. The 95%-confidence 
intervals are Bas-Priv. RF [-0.65,1.37] with a p-value of 0.477 and Bas-Pub. RF [-1.04,1.07] with a p-value of 0.981.  
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Figure 2. Empirical CDF of Help by Condition 
 
So far, there is no strong evidence in support of hypothesis H2-A, that relative performance 
concerns, activated by relative performance evaluations, have a sizable negative effect on group 
morale.  
However, with this type of statistical hypothesis testing one cannot control for the fact 
that beliefs about the value of own help to the group may be affected by relative performance 
information, which may counteract a negative treatment effect.  
Relative Performance Information and Confidence in Self and Others  
I find no evidence that self-confidence in answering general knowledge questions correctly 
is affected by rank feedback information.26 But I find that knowing performance ranks has a 
small but measurable impact on the confidence in the ability of the other two group members 
to answer general knowledge questions correctly in the expected direction.27 Taken together, 
these results imply that, for example, rank 1 group members who know their rank deem their 
help to be slightly more valuable, on average, than rank 1 group members in the baseline 
condition. This can potentially counteract a negative effect of relative performance concerns. 
                                         
26 Table B1 in Appendix B reports the results from OLS regressions that predict, conditional on performance rank, 
the percent chance that a participant assigns to himself having provided a correct answer to a Part 2 question as a 
function of treatment indicators and controls.  
27 Table A1 in Appendix A presents results from OLS regressions that predict the percent chance that a participant 
assigns to another group member providing a correct answer to a Part 2 question, conditional on the rank of the 
participant who makes this judgement, treatment indicators and further control variables. The results indicate that 
relative performance information systematically affects the confidence in other group members’ likelihood of providing 
correct answers in the expected direction, for rank 1, rank 2 and rank 3 group members in the private and the public 
rank feedback conditions. For example, observing their relative performance rank in private (public) reduces rank 1 
group members’ confidence in their other group members’ ability to provide correct answers to Part 2 questions by 
about 5.5 (7.2) percentage points. 
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Binary Choice Models Predicting the Willingness to Help 
In binary choice models that predict the willingness to share answers with others, I can control 
for beliefs about correct answers. I estimated the following general model:  nAo( >ℎ7Acp* = q rs + r^uQR*STU + r]uQWJTU + rv(cw'cD	>cwD	2oAAc2I+ rx(cw'cD	oIℎcA>	'e	qAo-)	2oAAc2I + yoeIAow>* + zbp  
shareki indicates whether participant i shared his answer to question k with the others. 
IprivRF,IpubRF indicate whether this participant privately observed his performance rank on the 
timed task or publicly observed the performance rank of everyone in his group. The variable 
belief correct self is the subjective probability that group member ' gave to his answer to question 
k being correct. The variable belief others in group correct is the average of the probabilities 
that group member ' gave to his two group members having provided a correct answer to 
question {. I introduce the other control variables below when I briefly consider results on the 
factors that correlate with helping decisions (section 5.3). I report results from Probit and Linear 
Probability Models.  
Table 6 columns 1)-3) show the results from fitting a Probit model. The first specification 
predicts the willingness to help as a function of treatment indicators with no further control 
variables. The predicted marginal effect of private rank feedback or public rank feedback on the 
willingness to help are very small and statistically insignificant (private RF: -0.036, public RF: 
-0.001) which confirms the previous findings from parametric and non-parametric hypothesis 
testing. 
The second specification adds controls for beliefs about correct answers. The willingness 
to share the answer to a question increases in the probability that a group member assigns to 
his answer being correct (belief correct (self), predicted marginal effect at means of 
covariates=66 percentage points) and decreases as he gives a higher probability to his group 
members having provided a correct answer (belief correct (others), predicted marginal effect at 
means of covariates=-28 percentage points). Both effects are highly statistically significant. The 
signs of the two coefficients, positive for belief correct (self) and negative for belief correct 
(others), indicate that participants help more when they believe their help will be valuable. 28  
Importantly, however, the introduction of these control variables does not change the 
inference about the treatment effect of relative performance evaluations on the willingness to 
                                         
28In Appendix B, I also present results from models in which I relate these belief variables, instead of testing for them 
separately (Table B3). I construct a control variable valuable help that ranges from [0,2]. It sums the two conditional 
probabilities that a participant ' assigns to her answer improving the performance of group member 1 and group 
member 2, conditional on the group member not knowing the answer to that question. I can back out these 
probabilities from the three beliefs about correct answers that participant '	stated for each Part 2 question under the 
assumption that they are independent. None of the results presented in the main text change when I control for the 
expected value of own help to others in this way. 
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help others perform better, the predicted marginal effects remain very close to zero (private RF 
-0.038, public RF 0.006).  
Table B2 in Appendix B presents results from specifications similar to the ones presented 
in columns 1-3 of Table 6 but pooling the data from the private and public rank feedback 
treatments. This further increases the power to detect a treatment effect. I pool the data from 
these two treatments because they had very comparable effects on the perceptions of competition 
in Part 1 (see Figure 1). These results also fail to reject hypothesis H2-0.  
I also perform additional robustness analysis in which I add terms that interact each 
treatment indicator with the variables belief correct (self) and belief correct (others) in a linear 
probability model. This directly tests whether participants are less likely to share the answers 
that they think are going to be valuable to others under either type of relative performance 
feedback. While the estimated sign of the interaction terms is typically negative—consistent 
with hypothesis H2-A—they are far from reaching statistical significance (see Table B4 in 
Appendix B). 
Heterogeneity in Treatment Effect by Rank in Competition  
Looking at average treatment effects in the whole sample could mask substantial 
heterogeneity in how strongly group members of different performance ranks change their help 
behavior after rank feedback. Error! Reference source not found. displays average helping 
by rank and by condition. For rank 1 and rank 2 group members, average help is slightly lower 
under relative performance evaluations, whereas it is slightly higher for rank 3 group members.  
Figure 3. Help by Treatment and Rank in Competition (Means)  
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Table 6. Predicting the Willingness to Help  
 Predicting Prob(share answer to question k) 
 Probit OLS 
Private RF -0.03623 
(0.0500) 
-0.0388 
(0.0562) 
-0.0132 
(0.0485) 
-0.00560 
(0.0330) 
Public RF -0.0012 
(0.0522) 
0.006 
(0.0571) 
0.0366 
(0.0458) 
0.0230 
(0.0310) 
Belief correct (self) 
 
0.659**** 
(0.0947) 
0.7803**** 
(0.1314) 
0.558**** 
(0.0654) 
Belief correct (others) 
 
-0.2762** 
(0.1126) 
-0.3682*** 
(0.1404) 
-0.269**** 
(0.0767) 
Actual correct 
  
-0.0088 
(0.0342) 
-0.00856 
(0.0225) 
Performance part 1 
  
0.1563 
(0.1506) 
0.125 
(0.0998) 
Expected help 
  
1.4436**** 
(0.1776) 
1.053**** 
(0.0661) 
Risk attitude 
  
-0.2478**** 
(0.0768) 
-0.150*** 
(0.0552) 
Female 
  
-0.0294 
(0.0487) 
-0.0234 
(0.0340) 
Question FE No No Yes Yes 
Constant Yes Yes Yes 
-0.334**** 
(0.0892) 
Obs. 2100 2100 2100 2100 
(pseudo) R2 0.0009 0.08 0.35 0.381 
Notes. Predicted marginal effects at mean level of covariates are reported (Probit). Share answer to question k is 
an indicator for whether participant shared the answer to a Part 2 question k with others. Private RF and Public 
RF are indicators for participant i privately observing his performance rank on the timed task or publicly 
observing the performance rank of everyone in the group. Belief correct self ranges from [0,1] and is the subjective 
probability that participant i gives to the event that his answer to question k is correct. Belief correct others 
ranges from [0,1] and is the subjective probability that participant i gives to the event that his average group 
member provided the correct answer to question k. Actual correct indicates whether participant i provided the 
correct answer to question k. Performance Part 1 records the fraction of questions that participant i answered 
correctly during the timed task of Part 1. Expected help is the fraction of answers hat participant i thinks the 
two group members shared, on average. Risk attitude is where participant i positioned himself on a scale from 
0=very risk-averse to 10=very risk seeking, divided by 10. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, 70 group 
clusters allow for correlated observations at the group and at the subject level. *Significant at the 10% level,** 
at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level, **** at the 0.1% level.  
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However, Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests fail to reject the null hypothesis that there are 
any differences in how help, conditional on rank, is distributed comparing help behavior in the 
baseline condition with help behavior under either type of relative performance feedback (see 
Table A5 in Appendix A for a summary of p-values).29  
Within each condition, higher ranked group members typically provide more help, on 
average, than lower ranked group members, consistent with an interpretation that participants 
use the help technology because they seek to improve the performance of others in their 
group.Finally, there is another way to consider heterogeneity in treatment effects based on 
performance on the timed task of Part 1. Note that relative performance information could be 
particularly relevant for individuals who perform neither exceptionally well nor very poorly on 
the timed general knowledge test. The absolute performance feedback in the baseline condition 
may have provided participants whose scores were on the tails of the performance distribution, 
e.g. 4 questions or 16 questions answered correctly, already with a clear sense of how these 
outcomes compare to the performance of others, thereby activating relative performance 
concerns also in the baseline. In additional robustness analysis, I account for the fact that the 
value of the treatment information may differ according to one’s absolute performance on the 
timed general knowledge task. Table B6 in Appendix B presents results of a Probit estimation 
that predicts the probability to share answers for subsamples of participants whose performance 
on the timed general knowledge test was neither exceptionally good nor bad according to 
performance percentiles. 
This additional robustness analysis confirms the finding that relative performance 
information per se appears to not lower the intrinsic motivation to help others perform better.  
This leads to the main result of the paper: 
Result 2: Hypothesis 2-0, that the performance competition under relative performance 
feedback has no effect on the willingness to help other group members perform better, 
cannot be rejected.  
                                         
29 In Appendix B I report results from binary choice models that predict the willingness to help conditional on 
performance rank, treatment indicators and controls for beliefs about correct answers. For this analysis, the data from 
the private rank feedback and public rank feedback treatments are pooled (Table B5). Even when I pool the data, 
for this type of analysis, the sample size is relatively small. This makes the inference that one can draw based on this 
sample limited, though the relatively small magnitudes suggest modest effects of the treatment on the willingness to 
help also when I allow for heterogeneous treatment effects. The point estimates of the treatment effect tend to be 
small in magnitude, e.g. the linear probability model predicts a marginal effect on the willingness to help by 6-11 
percentage points, and are never statistically significant. 
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Relative Performance Evaluations, Expected Help and Cooperative Behavior in General  
Consistent with this main result, the treatment manipulations do also not extend to have 
effects on neither the expected help behavior of others nor the general willingness to act 
cooperatively (see the results in Tabe A3 in Appendix A).  
 
To summarize, while the private and public rank feedback treatments reliably change 
perceptions of social relations in reference groups, that is, the sense of competition and social 
distance between group members, they do not systematically affect actual help behavior, 
expectations about the help behavior by other group members, the desire to help others in 
general or broader prosocial inclinations.  
4.3. What Predicts Variation in Help?  
In the following section, I consider variables other than treatment status and how they 
contribute to explaining variation in the willingness to help. This analysis provides insights into 
what motivates participants to share their answers with others.  
Column 3 of Table 6 shows results of a Probit estimation that predicts the willingness to 
help as a function of treatment indicators, performance controls, beliefs about correct answers, 
the expected help by others, risk attitudes, gender and question fixed effects.  
We have already seen that beliefs about correct answers are highly predictive of helping 
decisions. This suggests that participants share answers that they think will help other group 
members’ performance. This lends support to the interpretation that the task in Part 2 elicits 
group morale, that is, subjects share knowledge in order to improve the performance of others.  
The variable expected help ranges from [0,1] and is the fraction of Part 2 answers that a 
participant expected to have received from the two group members, on average. The point 
estimates of the coefficient suggest that the expected help by others has a sizeable effect on the 
willingness to help them perform better. 30 This is consistent with the interpretation that behavior 
in Part 2 is motivated by prosocial inclinations, i.e. positive reciprocity in the form of mutual 
positive expectations in a group.31 This provides further evidence suggesting that the task in 
Part 2 operationalizes group morale, whereby group members are more willing to help others 
who they think will also help them. 
 The coefficient on the measure of risk attitude suggests that individuals who describe 
themselves as risk-seeking are less willing to share their answers with others than individuals 
                                         
30 Note that the estimated and predicted marginal effect of the variable “Expected help” at the mean level of other 
covariates exceeds one. The predicted average marginal effect of the variable “Expected help” is, of course, smaller 
than one (0.96025 with a standard error of 0.0669).  
31 An alternative interpretation is more mechanical, whereby participants base expectations of others’ help on their 
own behavior.  
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who describe themselves as risk-averse. This may indicate that one motive behind knowledge-
sharing is to insure other group members against a lack of knowledge on a particular question.  
Conditional on this full set of controls, there are no gender differences in the willingness 
to share answers with others. In this context, women do not act systematically more prosocial 
than men. 
Lastly, there is no association between absolute performance on the timed general 
knowledge test and the willingness to help others in Part 2 of the experiment. In this decision 
context, the higher experimental earnings that group members were aware of when making help 
decisions did not translate into an increase in generosity.  
The corresponding OLS estimates, that largely agree with the Probit estimates, are 
reported in column 4 of Table 6.  
4.4. Relative Pay Treatment  
Next, I turn to the results from a control treatment that entails relative pay.32 With this data, 
I can directly compare the intensity of competition under relative performance information to 
the benchmark of a money competition. 
Competing for relative pay has a large and significant increase (about 4-points on a 9-
point scale) on the sense of competition in reference groups compared to the baseline in which 
relative concerns are absent (see Figure 1).  
I find no evidence that competing for relative pay increases the intensity of competition 
in reference groups, compared to otherwise identical environments in which group members only 
obtain relative performance information in private (two-sided t-test, p-value=0.166) or public 
(two-sided t-test, p-value=0.612). 
Results from an OLS regression indicate that relative pay also increases the social distance 
among members of a reference group (see Table 4 column 1). Competing for relative pay reduces 
the reported social closeness to the other group members by -0.469 points on average. This 
negative effect on the perceived social closeness among members of a reference group is 
comparable, in terms of absolute effect size, to how harmful the provision of private and public 
relative performance information is (see section 5.1).  
Taken together, these findings support the interpretation that the intensity of competition 
in reference groups is comparable across the domains of relative performance comparisons and 
relative pay. 
                                         
32 This treatment is the same as the private relative performance feedback treatment in terms of relative performance 
information that group members obtain at the end of Part 1 of the experiment. The best performer of a group makes 
a substantial monetary bonus that amounts to 25% od potential Part 1 earnings.  
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Consistent with this first result, I also find no evidence that competing for relative pay 
has a sizable negative (or positive33) effect on the willingness to extend costly help to improve 
the performance of other group members. The average treatment effect of relative pay on help 
is 0.639 answers shared less after the experience of a competition for pay, with a 95%-confidence 
interval [-0.45, 1.72] that includes zero. Results from choice models that predict the willingness 
to help others perform better as a function of an indicator variable for relative pay and controls 
for beliefs about correct answers confirm this conclusion (Table A4 in Appendix A). 
These findings provide further evidence that a competitive environment in and of itself 
does not systematically affect the willingness to extend costly help to improve the productivity 
of others. 
4.5. Missed Opportunities to Help and Productivity  
This paper sets out with the observation that it is important to understand what makes 
groups productive, in order to obtain a better understanding of the factors that determine 
productivity in firms. Next, I zoom in on the counterfactuals that are seldom observed outside 
of the laboratory. I identify the missed opportunities to help other group members perform better 
and quantify what they imply for group productivity and efficiency.  
A missed opportunity is defined as an instance in which one group member submitted the 
correct answer to a question but did not share the knowledge, with the result that another group 
member ended up submitting the wrong answer to a question. Each group in my experiment 
had, on average, 4.0 of such missed opportunities (SD=2.7).34 Group productivity would have 
increased by 18%, on average, had these answers been shared. The average efficiency loss of 
missed opportunities—unrealized group earnings under higher productivity net the cost of help—
is 5.8 CHF (≈5.8 USD) (SD=4.0). Table A6 in Appendix A also reports these numbers separately 
for each experimental condition. 
This analysis shows that a change in group morale, a decrease or increase, would have real 
consequences on group productivity in the environment under study. 
5. Discussion & Concluding Remarks  
The study investigates whether relative performance evaluations lower group morale in 
reference groups. In a laboratory experiment, I vary by treatment whether or not members of a 
                                         
33 In the relative pay treatment, the Part 1 earnings of the best performer are at least 25% higher compared to the 
other two group members. I find no evidence that this has any effect on the winner’s generosity to extend costly help, 
compared to the best performers in the baseline condition (ranskum test p-value=0.9583). 
34 Group members who did not share their answers, although they got it right and sharing could have improved the 
performance of at least one group member, had an average confidence of 64% that their answer was correct; in 50% 
of these cases group members gave a chance of at least 70% to their answer being correct. This indicates that the 
majority of these missed opportunities are, indeed, missed opportunities rather than people having simply guessed the 
right answer to a question that they did not share because they thought they would not know the answer.  
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reference group obtain relative performance feedback on a timed general knowledge test. Rank 
feedback is either given in private or in public. I then test how the salience of relative 
performance concerns under relative performance feedback spills over to the willingness to help 
others in the reference group perform better.  
The data show that relative performance evaluations on a task that people perceive as 
relevant for their social and self-image cause a large and lasting increase in the sense of 
competition in reference groups, compared to the baseline condition in which no relative 
performance feedback is provided. The intensity of competition under private or public rank 
feedback is comparable to how strongly members of reference groups compete for relative pay in 
a control treatment.  
Yet, I find no evidence that relative performance concerns from the competition spill over 
to subsequent help behavior. Relative performance evaluations and relative pay do not 
systematically change the willingness to help others in the group. Beliefs about the value of own 
help in terms of improving other group members’ performance are a strong predictor of actual 
help behavior, which is consistent with the interpretation that participants share knowledge in 
order to help the performance of others.  
How credible is this main finding regarding the hypothesis H2-0 on the willingness to help 
after a performance competition? 
The answer to this question is also linked to considerations of statistical power. Table 8 
reports the power of this study to detect the effect that relative performance evaluations may 
have on the average number of answers shared in Part 2 for different standardized effect sizes.35 
In addition to the conventional “large”, “medium” and “small” effect sizes that Cohen (1977) 
first suggested for the social sciences, I calculated standardized effect sizes in two related studies 
with similar experimental decision contexts36, using their most relevant outcome variables and 
treatment comparisons (see Appendix B for a detailed description). 
Buser and Dreber (2016) find that average contributions in a Public Goods Game are 
lower under relative pay concerns (standardized effect size d=0.287, two-sided t-test p=0.001). 
Carpenter at al. (2010) find that group members provide much less favorable assessments of the 
quality of their peers’ work output after the experience of a competition for relative pay 
(standardized effect size d=|0.621|37, two-sided t-test p=0.001). My study has a power of 0.4 to 
                                         
35 The standardized effect size & is defined in the following way & = |}~ÄÅÇÉ=|}~ÄÑÖ~ÇÑÜá}~Ä . I take this study’s sample size 
N=282 as fixed and determine the power of a two-sided t-test to reject the null hypothesis of no effect at the 0.05 
level of statistical significance or higher for different &.  
36 Both studies also have a between-subject design in which behavior under relative pay concerns (pay tournament) 
is compared to behavior in a baseline in which piece-rates are paid. Both studies document that competing for relative 
pay in a first stage has negative behavioral spillovers to subsequent prosocial or anti-social behavior in groups when 
the two stages are in no way strategically linked. 
37 Due to the construction of the variable, the stand. effect size is -0.621 (negative 0.621) in Carpenter et al. (2010) 
but with the same implication: the average assessment of other group members’ production quality is much lower 
under the impression of relative pay concerns in reference groups.  
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detect a standardized effect size d=0.287 of relative performance concerns on average help and 
a power close to 1 (0.959) if the true effect size was d=0.62. For what is typically considered a 
medium effect size of d=0.5 my study would reject the null hypothesis of no effect 85% of the 
times, with the likelihood of a Type-2 error at 15%.  
Table 8 Power of Study for Different Standardized Effect Sizes 
source stand. effect size (d) power 
Cohen (1977)  0.8 0.998 
Carpenter et. al. (2012) 0.621 0.959 
Cohen (1977) 0.5 0.846 
Buser and Dreber (2016) 0.287 0.401 
Cohen (1977) 0.2 0.222 
Notes. The reported power is the one of a two-sided t-test with a 
level of significance of at least α=0.05 given this study’s sample 
size of 282 participants. 
In other words, the results from this study tell us that it is very unlikely that relative 
performance concerns—caused by relative performance evaluations or relative performance 
pay—have a substantial negative effect on the willingness to help others perform better at work.38  
This experimental study can pin down the effect of relative performance evaluations on 
group morale because I precisely control one of the major confounding factors that arise in 
organizational settings outside of the laboratory in which, at least in the medium run, higher 
relative performances may come with monetary rewards. There are several reasons why the main 
result is informative about how employees or students outside of the laboratory work together. 
Experimental reference groups in the sample of students are similar to students’ actual 
“professional” reference groups. Moreover, knowledge-sharing is an important dimension of how 
co-workers in firms can help the productivity of each other.  
In important ways, the experimental decision environment was conducive to uncovering a 
negative effect of relative performance concerns on the willingness to help others perform better. 
Firstly, the performance ranking was established on general knowledge and the helping behavior 
involved sharing knowledge in the same type of general knowledge questions. The spillover from 
a performance competition should be largest when relative performance rankings are established 
on a particular job and then co-workers can help each other to perform better on that job. 
Secondly, helping others in the reference group was costly and there was no monetary benefit to 
                                         
38 The findings of this study cannot speak as confidently about small effect sizes. Reassuringly, if we think about the 
policy implications of this work, it would be most important to know about sizable costs that relative performance 
evaluations may have on how members of a reference group work together. 
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helping for the person that extends help. This makes helping in my experiment a generous act. 
Moreover, in the absolute majority of reference groups (95%), the members did not know each 
other prior to the experiment39 and the experimental protocol did not reveal anything about the 
group members’ identities other than what is revealed in a portrait. This type of intrinsically 
motivated help should be most sensitive to changes in the level of competition in reference 
groups, in particular when strangers are at the receiving end of it. Thirdly, the experimental 
design ruled out that others could observe individual help behavior. Participants helped privately 
and made all helping decisions once and at the same time. In this environment, the decision not 
to help was essentially impossible to detect and so was the decision to help. 
Therefore, the fact that I find no evidence that relative performance evaluations negatively 
affect group morale in this decision environment is particularly informative. There is no reason 
to believe that relative performance concerns may lower the willingness to help others perform 
better in many other relevant contexts, e.g. when help behavior is observable by others or when 
there are monetary rewards to it.  
Previous experimental work on on-the-job help typically modeled help as the transfer of 
money. The task introduced in this experiment measures “real help” behavior of participants 
who can share knowledge for the benefit of others and the outcome of these help decisions 
depends on own and others’ performances. The knowledge-sharing task is versatile and easy to 
implement in a laboratory setting. I hope that this task will prove useful for researchers who are 
interested in studying the determinants of on-the-job help. 
There are now several studies, including this one, that come to the conclusion that relative 
performance ranks make a qualitative difference compared to an environment in which this 
information is not given but not whether it is provided in public or private (see also Tran and 
Zeckhauser 2012; Ashraf et al. 2014). A general lesson for feedback design seems to emerge here, 
namely, that relative performance information, provided in private or in public, will put members 
of the reference group in a comparative and also competitive mind-set. 
This study provides first evidence on how the intensity of competition in reference groups 
compares under relative performance information and relative pay. There is no evidence that 
the introduction of relative pay further increases the level of competition in reference groups. 
This finding suggests that, at least in some contexts, relative performance evaluations may 
substitute relative pay in tournaments. An interesting avenue for future research is to 
systematically compare individual effort choices under non-monetary and monetary tournaments 
and when they interact.  
The main result on the willingness to help across experimental conditions advances our 
understanding of when relative performance evaluations do, and when they do not backfire in 
                                         
39 Out of 282 participants, 6 participants (2%) answered that they knew one person in his or her reference group and 
1 participant (0.3%) answered that he or she knew both members of his or her reference group.  
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reference groups. Charness, Masclet and Villeval (2014) find that relative performance rankings 
lead to costly unethical behavior in reference groups because group members want to change an 
initial ranking to a final ranking that is more favorable for them. The authors interpret this 
main finding as an expression of group members’ competitive preferences and their desire for 
dominance. The decision environment of this study completely removed the strategic link 
between knowledge-sharing and the ranking outcome itself and competitive preferences under 
relative performance evaluations did not have a negative consequence on help behavior. Taken 
together, these results suggest that the frequency of relative performance evaluations may 
determine whether ore not they have a negative impact on the way members of reference group 
work together. 
 The objectivity of the relative performance assessment may have mitigated a potential 
adverse effect on the willingness to help the productivity of others. Group members knew on 
what grounds the ranking was established and that the computer impartially implemented the 
ranking based on performance at the first general knowledge test. The findings by Breza et al. 
(2018) lend support to this speculation. They find that the negative effects of relative 
performance pay in workgroups depend on how transparent it was to co-workers that others in 
the reference group were more productive. Their results indicate that co-workers who knew that 
pay differences arose from observable performance differences did not react negatively, either by 
exerting less effort or cooperating less well. In organizations, relative performance evaluations 
can also mirror subjective perceptions of superiors. At least employees can perceive this to be 
the case. It may, therefore, be advisable to transparently communicate criteria and performance 
metrics on which grounds relative performance evaluations are established. It would be 
interesting to investigate in future work to what extent subjectivity and transparency of 
evaluation criteria mediate the effect that relative performance evaluations have on group morale 
or other workgroup behavior. 
My results thus draw attention to the challenge of understanding better when relative 
concerns among employees do and when they do not backfire in reference groups. I find no 
evidence that relative performance evaluations, whether or not they entail monetary 
consequences, may have negative consequences for group productivity. The unambiguous 
positive lesson from this study is that there is no evidence that relative performance concerns in 
reference groups lower the intrinsic motivation to help others perform better. 
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Appendix A  
Appendix A presents the following additional figures:  
1. figures of the feedback screens in the baseline, the private rank feedback condition and 
the public rank feedback condition 
2. pictogram of the Inclusion of the Self in Other (IOS) scale 
3. empirical distribution of performance on the timed general knowledge test by 
experimental condition 
4. figures of participants’ evaluations of the decision environment in Part 1  
 
Appendix A contains the following additional tables: 
1. Results of OLS regressions that show how a participant’s confidence in his group 
members ability to provide correct answers to Part 2 questions changes when relative 
performance feedback is given. This analysis conditions on the rank of the participant 
who makes the judgements.  
2. List and summary statistics of all questionnaire items from which the indices on 
attitudes toward cooperation, competition, group work and autonomy are constructed 
3. Rank Feedback, Relative Pay and Expected Help, General Cooperativeness and 
Prosocial Inclinations 
4. Results of OLS regressions and Probit models predicting the willingness to share 
answers with others comparing the baseline to the relative pay condition, controlling 
for beliefs about correct answers  
5. A table that shows the average efficiency loss in groups due to missed opportunities to 
help and the unrealized gains in group productivity due to missed opportunities to help 
by experimental conditions   
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Figure A1. Information Provided at the End of Part 1 (Baseline Condition) 
 
Figure A2. Information Provided at the End of Part 1 (Private Rank Feedback 
Condition) 
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 Figure A3. Information Provided at the End of Part 1 (Public Rank Feedback Condition) 
 
Notes. The faces of participants are blurred here to preserve their anonymity.   
Figure A4. Information Provided at the End of Part 1 (Relative Pay Condition) 
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Figure A5. Help Decision Screen (Public Rank Feedback Condition) 
 
Notes. In all conditions, this screen displayed the portrait of every group member. Across 
conditions, the help decision screens only varied in the summary of performance on the timed 
task of Part 1, displayed in the box in the upper right corner of the screen. The screen of the 
baseline condition did only show how many question a participant answered correctly. In the 
private rank feedback condition the box also showed the performance rank of the participant who 
was looking at that screen. In addition to this information, in the relative pay condition, the 
participant who was looking at the screen also found out whether or not he had obtained an 
additional bonus payment.  
 
Figure A6. Pictogram of the Inclusion of the Self in Other (IOS) scale 
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Figure A7. Empirical CDF of Performance on Timed General Knowledge Test by Condition 
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Figure A8. Participants' Evaluations of Part 1 Decision Environment 
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Table A1. Rank Feedback and Confidence in Others' Performance  
OLS predicting 
belief of participant i of per cent chance that group member (GM) j answered question k correctly 
 Rank 1 
 participant i 
 Rank 2  
participant i 
Rank 3  
participant i 
Private RF -5.546** 
(2.755) 
-5.262* 
(2.698) 
Private RF -0.606 
(3.193) 
-1.201 
(3.227) 
10.09**** 
(2.948) 
10.07**** 
(2.893) 
Public RF -7.171*** 
(2.702) 
-7.358*** 
(2.551) 
Public RF 2.348 
(3.425) 
-0.943 
(3.665) 
11.49**** 
(3.421) 
9.153** 
(3.481) 
GM j rank 3  -0.830 
(1.227) 
GM j rank 1  0.0935 
(1.512) 
 -0.153 
(0.835) 
Priv. RF X 
GM j rank 3 
 -0.571 
(1.441) 
Priv. RF X 
GM j rank 1 
 1.187 
(1.865) 
 -0.0897 
(1.158) 
Pub. RF X 
GM j rank 3 
 0.362 
(2.072) 
Pub. RF X 
GM j rank 1 
 6.518**** 
(1.864) 
 4.558** 
(1.759) 
Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 61.44**** 
(12.04) 
61.83**** 
(12.04) 
Constant 25.66*** 
(8.827) 
25.50*** 
(8.788) 
41.81**** 
(8.193) 
41.76**** 
(8.261) 
Obs. 1400 1400 Obs. 1400 1400 1400 1400 
R2 0.1391 0.1396  0.1585 0.1636 0.1327 0.1354 
Notes. Private RF and Public RF are indicators for participant i privately observing his performance rank on the 
timed task or publicly observing the performance rank of everyone in his group, respectively. GM j rank 1 and GM 
j rank 3 are indicators for whether the group member that participant i judges has performance rank 1 or 3, 
respectively, on the timed task in Part 1. These indicators are also interacted with the treatment indicators. The 
following variables are controlled for. Actual correct variable indicates whether participant i or the group member 
j that he judges provided a correct answer to a Part 2 question k. Performance Part 1 records the number of 
questions that participant i answered correctly during the timed task in Part 1. Risk attitude is where participant 
i positioned himself on a scale from 0=very risk-averse to 10=very risk seeking. Female indicates whether 
participant i is a woman. Female group member indicates whether group member j is a woman. *Significant at the 
10% level,** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level, **** at the 0.1% level. 
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Table A2. Questionnaire Items on Attitudes Toward Cooperation, Competition, Working in 
Groups and Working Alone 
Item Category Mean SD 
I am drawn to compete with others. Competitiveness  4.98 2.07 
It annoys me when others perform better 
than I do. Competitiveness  5.16 2.15 
I feel that winning or losing doesn’t matter 
to me. Competitiveness (-) 3.86 2.09 
I avoid competitive situations. Competitiveness (-) 4.57 2.24 
I love to help others. Cooperativeness  7.33 1.34 
I like to share my ideas and material with 
others. Cooperativeness  6.54 1.63 
I avoid doing favors to others. Cooperativeness (-) 2.70 1.73 
I expect everyone to look out for 
themselves. Cooperativeness (-) 5.57 1.94 
I like to work things out on my own. Autonomy  6.92 1.63 
Given the choice, I prefer to work on an 
assignment alone rather than getting an 
assignment in which I have to work 
together with others. 
Autonomy 5.37 2.14 
I find it hard to work by myself.   Autonomy (-) 2.73 1.55 
I find I am less productive when I work by 
myself. Autonomy(-) 3.05 1.83 
I can learn important things from other 
colleagues or fellow students. Groupwork 7.94 1.29 
I like working in groups. Groupwork 5.79 1.97 
In workgroups, one person does typically 
most of the work. Groupwork (-) 5.88 1.94 
I find that working in groups is often 
inefficient. Groupwork (-) 5.65 1.97 
Notes. This table summarizes all the fours items from which the index for that category is constructed. 
The answers to each question ranges from 1- does not apply at all to 9- definitely applies. The index is 
the average score across the four items of a category and negatively keyed items are reverse scored.  
  
44 
 
Table A3. Rank Feedback, Relative Pay and Expected Help, General Cooperativeness and 
Prosocial Inclinations  
 Expected Help Cooperativeness Positive Reciprocity 
Negative 
Reciprocity 
Private RF -0.201 
(0.389) 
-0.101 
(0.175) 
-1.008* 
(0.522) 
-0.771 
(0.744) 
Public RF -0.0789 
(0.388) 
-0.0571 
(0.176) 
-0.457 
(0.556) 
0.00184 
(0.777) 
Relative Pay -0.403 
(0.417) 
0.0590 
(0.211) 
-0.485 
(0.577) 
-0.522 
(0.874) 
Constant 4.632**** 
(0.215) 
5.955**** 
(0.124) 
13.63**** 
(0.391) 
10.83**** 
(0.513) 
Obs. 282 282 282 282 
R2 0.0039 0.0030 0.0093 0.0048 
Notes. Private RF and Public RF are indicators for participant i privately observing his performance 
rank on the timed task or publicly observing the performance rank of everyone in his group, 
respectively. Expected help is the number of answers to Part 2 questions that participant i thinks his 
two group members shared with him on average. Cooperativeness is an index that measures the desire 
to help others in general and runs from 1 (very low) to 9 (very high). Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses, 94 group clusters allow for correlated observations at the group and at the subject level. 
*Significant at the 10% level,** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. 
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Table A4. Predicting the Willingness to Help Under Relative Pay Compared to Baseline 
 Predicting Prob(share answer to question k) 
 Probit  OLS 
Relative Pay -0.0641 
(0.0478) 
-0.0559 
(0.0527) 
-0.06388 
(0.04784) 
-0.05258 
(0.04883) 
Belief correct (self) 
 
0.6442**** 
(0.0950) 
 
0.60298**** 
(0.08113) 
Belief correct (others) 
 
-0.2064* 
(0.1076) 
 
-0.19484* 
(0.09987) 
Constant 
Yes Yes 
0.40277**** 
(0.0261) 
0.1193** 
(0.0522) 
Obs. 1,440 1,440 1,440 1,440 
(pseudo) R2 0.003 0.088 0.004 0.1109 
Notes. Predicted marginal effects at mean level of covariates are reported (Probit). Share answer to question k is 
an indicator for whether participant shared the answer to a Part 2 question k with others. Relative Pay is an 
indicator for participant i privately observing his performance rank on the timed task and the best performer 
receiving a substantial monetary bonus at the end of the timed task. Belief correct self ranges from [0,1] and is 
the subjective probability that participant i gives to the event that his answer to question k is correct. Belief 
correct others ranges from [0,1] and is the subjective probability that participant i gives to the event that his 
average group member provided the correct answer to question k. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, 48 
group clusters allow for correlated observations at the group and at the subject level. *Significant at the 10% 
level,** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level, **** at the 0.1% level.  
Table A5 Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Tests  
rank compare number of answers shared across conditions p-value 
1 
Baseline-Private RF 0.6474 
Baseline-Public RF 0.7989 
2 
Baseline-Private RF 0.2118 
Baseline-Public RF 0.2973 
3 
Baseline-Private RF 0.6070 
Baseline-Public RF 0.728 
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Table A6. Missed Opportunities to Help, Efficiency and Group Productivity by Experimental 
Condition  
 Average 
efficiency loss 
Average  
gains in group 
productivity 
Baseline 5.12 CHF 15.2% 
Private RF 5.29 CHF 16.3% 
Public RF 6.57 CHF 21.7% 
Relative Pay  6.27 CHF 20.0%  
Total 5.80 CHF 18.2% 
Notes. Average efficiency loss due to missed opportunities to 
help is the amount of unrealized group earnings net the cost of 
help in a group, averaged over all groups. Average gains in 
group productivity is the number of missed opportunities in a 
group over a group’s total productivity, averaged over all 
groups.  
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Appendix B  
Appendix B contains the following additional tables: 
 
1. Results of OLS regressions which show that a participant’s confidence in his or her ability 
to answer questions correctly is not systemtically affected by relative performance 
feedback 
2. Results of Probit estimations that predict the willingness to help, pooling the data 
from the private and the public rank feedback treatments.  
3. Results of a Probit estimation and an OLS regression that predict the willingness to 
help when beliefs about correct answers are controlled for in a different way than the 
one presented in the main text 
4. Result of an OLS regression in which beliefs about correct answers (self and others) are 
interacted with the treatment indicators 
5. Results of Probit estimations and OLS regressions that predict the probability of 
sharing an answer to a question separately for each sub-group with the same 
performance rank, pooling the data from the private rank feedback and the public rank 
feedback treatments 
6. Results of a Probit estimation that predicts the probability of sharing an answer to a 
question for the subset of participants whose performance at the timed general 
knowledge task was neither very good nor very bad according to performance 
percentiles  
 
Appendix B then presents how the benchmark effect sizes from the two related studies used 
for the power analysis were obtained.  
 
Appendix B ends with screenshots of the instructions and decision screens as they were presented 
to participants. For this Appendix B, the faces of participants in the pictures are blurred to 
preserve their anonymity. In the experiment, the faces were not blurred.  
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Table B1. Rank Feedback and Self-Confidence 
 OLS predicting 
belief of participant i of percent chance that he 
answered question k correctly 
 Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3 
Private RF 1.577 
(3.183) 
-5.330* 
(3.144) 
2.594 
(3.179) 
Public RF -1.295 
(2.526) 
-0.0875 
(3.348) 
2.260 
(3.323) 
Actual correct 31.53**** 
(2.011) 
28.81**** 
(2.147) 
30.05**** 
(2.333) 
Performance Part 1 -3.789 
(2.641) 
-3.090 
(2.254) 
-0.370** 
(0.156) 
Risk attitude 0.360 
(0.469) 
0.295 
(0.683) 
0.451 
(0.539) 
Female 3.736 
(2.411) 
-1.997 
(2.866) 
-2.808 
(2.745) 
Constant 48.20**** 
(4.171) 
52.16**** 
(5.421) 
43.98**** 
(4.444) 
Obs. 700 700 700 
R2 0.2542 0.2097 0.2276 
 Notes. Private RF and Public RF are indicators for participant i privately observing his performance rank on the 
timed task or publicly observing the performance rank of everyone in his group, respectively. Actual correct variables 
indicate whether participant i provided a correct answer to a Part 2 question k. Performance Part 1 records the 
number of questions that participant i answered correctly during the timed test in Part 1. Risk attitude is where 
participant i positioned himself on a scale from 1=very risk-averse to 10=very risk seeking. Female indicates whether 
participant ' is a woman. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, group clusters allow for correlated observations 
at the group and at the subject level. *Significant at the 10% level,** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level, **** at 
the 0.1% level.  
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Table B2. Predicting the Willingness to Help—Probit (pooled data) 
 Probit Predicting 
Prob(share answer to question k) 
Relative performance 
information 
-0.019 
(0.0404) 
-0.0168 
(0.0453) 
0.00985 
(0.0385) 
Belief correct (self)  0.6570
**** 
(0.0950) 
0.7782**** 
(0.13413) 
Belief correct  
(others)   
-0.2753*** 
(0.1125) 
-0.3657*** 
(0.1427) 
Actual correct   -0.0109 (0.0337) 
Performance part 1   0.1477 (0.1535) 
Expected help    1.4410
**** 
(0.1813) 
Risk attitude    -0.2463
**** 
(0.0761) 
Female    -0.0305 (0.050) 
Question FE No No Yes 
Constant Yes Yes  Yes 
Obs. 2100 2100 2100 
pseudo R2 0.0003 0.0795 0.3541 
Notes. The predicted marginal effects at mean level of covariates are reported.  
Share answer to question k is an indicator for whether participant shared the answer 
to a Part 2 question k with his group members. Private RF and Public RF are 
indicators for participant i privately observing his performance rank on the timed 
task or publicly observing the performance rank of everyone in his group, 
respectively. Belief correct self ranges from [0,1] and is the subjective probability 
that participant i gives to the event that the answer he provided to question k is 
correct. Belief correct others ranges from [0,1] and is the subjective probability that 
participant i gives to the event that his average group member provided the correct 
answer to question k. Actual correct indicates whether participant i provided the 
correct answer to question k. Performance Part 1 records the fraction of questions 
that participant i answered correctly during the timed task in Part 1. Expected help 
is the fraction of answers to questions k that participant i thinks the two group 
members shared with him on average. Risk attitude is where participant i positioned 
himself on a scale from 1=very risk-averse to 10=very risk seeking, divided by 10. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses, 70 group clusters allow for correlated 
observations at the group and at the subject level. *Significant at the 10% level,** 
at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level, **** at the 0.1% level. 
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Table B3. Predicting the Willingness to Help Controlling for Beliefs About the Value of Help to 
the Group 
 Predicting Prob(share answer to question {) 
 Probit OLS 
Private RF -0.03821 (0.0519) 
-0.0366 
(0.0508) 
Public RF -0.0012 (0.0522) 
-0.000669 
(0.0520) 
Valuable help 0.2434
**** 
(0.0645) 
0.246**** 
(0.0636) 
Constant  0.306
**** 
(0.0362) 
Obs.  2100 2100 
(pseudo) R2 0.0157 0.021 
Notes. For the treatment indicators and control variables, the predicted 
marginal effects at mean level of covariates are reported (Probit). Share 
answer for question { is an indicator for whterh participant shared tha 
nswer to a Part 2 question {	with his group members. Private RF and 
Public RF are indicators for participant i privately observing his 
performance rank on the timed task or publicly observing the 
performance rank of everyone in his group, respectively. Valuable help 
ranges from [0,2]. It sums the two conditional probabilities that a 
participant ' assigns to her answer improving the performance of group 
member 1 and group member 2, conditional on the group member not 
knowing the answer to that question. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses, 70 group clusters allow for correlated observations at the 
group and at the subject level. *Significant at the 10% level,** at the 
5% level, *** at the 1% level, **** at the 0.1% level. 
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Table B4. Interacting Treatment Indicators with Beliefs About Correct Answers 
Linear Probability Model Predicting 
Prob(share answer to question k) 
Private RF -0.00507 
(0.102) 
Public RF 0.148 
(0.120) 
Belief correct (self)  0.702**** 
(0.110) 
Belief correct (others)  -0.266* 
(0.150) 
Belief correct (self)  
X Private RF 
-0.0573 
(0.185) 
Belief correct (others)  
X Private RF 
0.0141 
(0.229) 
Belief correct (self)  
X Public RF 
-0.209 
(0.169) 
Belief correct (others)  
X Public RF 
-0.00472 
(0.238) 
Constant 0.0974 
(0.0704) 
Obs. 2100 
R2 0.1055 
Notes. Private RF and Public RF are indicators for 
participant i privately observing his performance rank on 
the timed task or publicly observing the performance rank 
of everyone in his group, respectively. Belief correct self 
ranges from [0,1] and is the subjective probability that 
participant i gives to the event that the answer he provided 
to question k is correct. Belief correct others ranges from 
[0,1] and is the subjective probability that participant i 
gives to the event that his average group member provided 
the correct answer to question k. Robust standard errors are 
in parentheses, 70 group clusters allow for correlated 
observations at the group and at the subject level. 
*Significant at the 10% level,** at the 5% level, *** at the 
1% level, **** at the 0.1% level. 
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Table B5. Predicting the Willingness to Help for each Rank Sub-Group (pooled data) 
 Predicting Prob (share answer to question k) 
 Probit OLS 
 Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3 Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3 
Rel. Performance 
Feedback 
-0.0656 
(0.0942) 
-0.0793 
(0.0838) 
0.12037 
(0.0830) 
-0.0602 
(0.0891) 
-0.0739 
(0.0774) 
0.109 
(0.0736) 
Belief correct (self) 0.5703
**** 
(0.1569) 
0.6219**** 
(0.1489) 
0.6514**** 
(0.1197) 
0.538**** 
(0.135) 
0.588**** 
(0.133) 
0.616**** 
(0.0951) 
Belief correct (others) -0.2277 (0.2100) 
-0.0878 
(0.1813) 
-0.4304*** 
(0.1769) 
-0.207 
(0.190) 
-0.102 
(0.170) 
-0.418*** 
(0.154) 
Constant Yes Yes  Yes 0.280
** 
(0.119) 
0.104 
(0.0978) 
0.102 
(0.0722) 
Obs. 700 700 700 700 700 700 
(pseudo) à] 0.0518 0.1010 0.0937 0.069 0.128 0.1070 
Mean number of 
answers shared 4.93 3.86 2.91 4.93 3.86 2.91 
Notes. The predicted marginal effects at mean level of covariates are reported (Probit). Relative performance 
information indicates whether participant i obtained any information on relative performances on the timed 
task. Belief correct self ranges from [0,1] and is the subjective probability that participant i gives to the 
event that the answer he provided to Part 2 question k is correct. Belief correct others ranges from [0,1] and 
is the subjective probability that participant i gives to the event that his average group member provided 
the correct answer to Part 2 question k. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, 70 group clusters allow 
for correlated observations at the group and at the subject level. *Significant at the 10% level,** at the 5% 
level, *** at the 1% level, **** at the 0.1% level. 
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Table B6. Rank Feedback and Willingness to Help for Non-Extreme Performance on Timed 
General Knowledge Test 
 Probit Predicting Prob(share answer to question k) 
 
10th performance percentile> 
timed test performance i 
<90th performance percentile 
25th performance percentile>= 
timed test performance i 
<=75th performance percentile 
Private RF -0.0724 (0.0630) 
-0.0780 
(0.0699) 
Public RF 0.02063 (0.0620) 
0.0187 
(0.0687) 
Belief correct (self) 0.6251**** (0.0989) 
0.5845**** 
(0.1056) 
Belief correct (others) -0.18671 (0.1271) 
-0.1551 
(0.1329) 
Constant Yes Yes 
Obs. 1570 1420 
pseudo R2 0.0877 0.0757 
Notes. Predicted marginal effects at mean level of covariates are reported. Share answer to question k is 
an indicator for whether participant shared the answer to a Part 2 question k with others. Private RF 
and Public RF are indicators for participant i privately observing his performance rank on the timed task 
or publicly observing the performance rank of everyone in his group, respectively. Belief correct self ranges 
from [0,1] and is the subjective probability that participant i gives to the event his answer to question k 
is correct. Belief correct others ranges from [0,1] and is the subjective probability that participant i gives 
to the event that his average group member provided the correct answer to question k. *Significant at the 
10% level,** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level, **** at the 0.1% level  
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Effect Size Benchmark Calculation: Carpenter, Matthews and Schirm (2010) 
The real effort task in this study was to prepare letters for mailing, which included to stuff 
a letter in an envelope and to write the address on that envelope. The outcome variable that I 
use in the benchmark effect size calculations is the difference in the assessment of participant	'’s 
production quality when it is done by an objective postal worker or by peers of the same reference 
groups. Whenever this difference is positive, it means that peer group members engage in 
“quality sabotage”. Quality was rated on a scale from [0,1] for one randomly selected envelope.  
I calculated the effect size benchmark comparing quality sabotage in the “Tournament” 
treatment to quality sabotage in the baseline (“Piece-Rate”) condition. I chose this treatment 
because the peer assessments of the quantity and quality of others’ output had no effect on the 
likelihood of winning the relative pay competition, unlike the “Tournament with Sabotage” 
treatment. The 25 USD bonus was paid to the group member with the highest quality-adjusted 
output at a real effort task.  In this Tournament condition, only the experimenter’s quality and 
quantity assessment of all group members’ work output mattered to determine top performer. 
Also in the piece-rate benchmark the quality assessment of peers had no material consequences.  
 
Effect Size Benchmark Calculation: Buser and Dreber (2014) 
The outcome variable that I used for effect size calculations are a participant '’s 
contributions in Public Goods Game (PGG). I selected their treatment that is most similar to 
my two treatments. In the “Competition with Feedback” treatment, participants compete for 
relative pay at a real effort task, a slider-task, and observe at the end of this stage whether they 
won or lost before they make their allocation decisions in the PGG. In the “Competition” 
treatment, by contrast, participants find out at the very end of the study whether they lost or 
won the relative pay competition. 
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In the following, I reproduce screenshots of the instructions and decision screens exactly as 
they were shown to participants.  
 
Screen 1: Introduction  
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Screen 2: Instructions for Part 1 – first untimed general knowledge test 
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Screen 3: Part 1 Stage 1 – First General Knowledge Test Questions 1-5 
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Screen 4: Part 1 Stage 1 – First General Knowledge Test Questions 6-10 
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Screen 5: Confirmation of picture  
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Screen 6: Introduction of Groups  
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Screen 7: Instructions for the Timed task with varying relative performance feedback (by 
treatment) 
 
Notes. These are the instructions for the public rank feedback condition. The instructions for the other 
two conditions only differed in what was described to the participants they would see in the feedback 
screen. For example, the instructions of the private rank feedback condition stopped after bullet B) in the 
textbox in the screen.   
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Screen 8: Timed task (3 minutes) 
 
Notes. This is the first question of the timed task. Once a subject submitted an answer to a question the 
next one appeared on the screen.
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Screen 9: Treatment screen Baseline Condition (feedback about performance at timed task) 
 
Screen 9: Treatment screen (feedback about performance at timed task) Private Feedback 
Condition 
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Screen 9: Treatment screen (feedback about performance at timed task) Public Rank Feedback 
Condition 
 
 
Screen 9: Treatment screen (feedback about performance at timed task) Relative Pay 
Condition 
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Screen 10: Instructions for the Help Game (Part 2) 
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Screen 11: Control Question Help Game 
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Screen 12: Instructions for the Help Game (summary after control questions)  
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Screen 13: Help Decisions 1-5 
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Screen 14: Help Decisions 6-10 
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Screen 15: Instructions Belief Elicitation (1)  
 
Notes. I modeled these instructions after Coffman (2014) which are publicly available. 
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Screen 16: Instructions Belief Elicitation (2)  
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Screen 17:  Control Questions Belief Elicitation  
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The order in which these beliefs were elicited was fully randomized at the participant level. 
Screen 18: Decision Screen Beliefs (1) 
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The order in which these beliefs were elicited was fully randomized at the participant level. 
Screen 19: Decision Screen Beliefs (2) 
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Screen 20: Expected Help by Others 
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Screen 21: Questionnaire Manipulation Checks and Attitudes 
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Screen 22: Questionnaire Attitudes (continued) 
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Screen 23: Positive Reciprocity (Falk et al. 2016)  
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Screen 24: Negative Reciprocity (Falk et al. 2016)  
 
 
